Ryan Gilbert

The relationship between North Korea and Russia (as well as the USSR by extension) originated out of strategic need, and even to this day, is still largely defined by strategy rather than pure friendship or mutual affinity. The 38th parallel, which has now become synonymous with modern Korean history, is where our story of North Korean-Russian relations begins. The division of the Korean peninsula between the two conquering powers, the United States and the USSR, created a change in their bilateral relations from a circumstantial alliance in World War II due to a common enemy, into a geopolitical war of political influence. Each nation, the US and USSR respectively, being staunch in its political rhetoric and anxious to cement its respective dominance through the widespread global adoption of its ideologies, produced conditions wherein the two Koreas became opportunities for democracy and communism to be implemented and to encompass the identity of each Korea. To the USSR’s advantage, the stage had already been set for communism to be implemented without much protest, as post-war conditions left North Korea weak and desperate for leadership and a collective direction. Furthermore, North Korean nationalists since the early twentieth century had already begun to adopt not just a communist sentiment but bolshevik ideology inspired by the Russian Revolution of 1917. The birth of these notions was due to the struggles against Japanese colonial rule which produced large amounts of discontent, spurring on nationalist angst and desire for a re-shaping of national image.^[1]

Very quickly after the conclusion of World War II, the Soviet Union looked to find their ideal Korean authoritarian and Stalinist leader to help champion their geopolitical communist cause. This cause was to spread communism globally and to represent the political system well, meaning representing communism as the superior political system/ideology by leading a successful and self-sufficient country. A former guerrilla officer who fought alongside Russian forces in World War II, Kim Il-Sung emerged as a sensible option to fulfill Russian desires for the future outlook of North Korean policy. (More about him in the chapter The Kim Family Dynasty of North Korea) Indeed, he fulfilled this role and more: adopting the desire to spread communism, Kim pushed hard to be allowed to invade the south in hopes of unification just four years after the conclusion of World War II.^[2] Sure enough, Stalin gave him the green light in 1950. This conflict, known to United States nationals as the Korean War, exemplified relations between the major players that were involved in it for many years to come after. This was to be: a strict division between the two Koreas geographically and politically, with the puppeteers’ arms of the USSR controlling the north and the south supplied and supplemented ideologically and monetarily by the U.S. However, the relative autonomy that was given to Kim under the guidance of communism was soon to prove detrimental for bilateral relations for the two countries. Kim looked to pursue a more isolationist policy for his new nation, still grounded in communism however, but with a significant difference in its strategic implementation. Kim decided to focus an approach he called Juche, meaning “self-reliance”, and this policy would go on to define North Korean objectives as far as the current day.^[3] This shift in policy occurred starting around the 1960s. This was for a very specific reason as well. The relationship between the USSR and North Korea had a new development in it, after Khrushchev’s “secret speech” to the interior, he detailed Stalin’s shortcomings and called for the end of the “cult of personality” style leadership. This of course extended to all the other authoritarian communist leaders propped up by the USSR, and Kim Il-Sung was without a doubt engaged in personal glorification as a leader the most out of all others. Through various meetings with USSR officials, and even a visit to the Soviet Union, he gave all assurances that things would change.^[4] This occurred once again upon his return where he addressed his own personnel. This meeting he held would be the last time where he faced any opposition whatsoever from internal rivals. Chinese-Korean communists and Soviet-Korean communists voiced their complaints, only to be shouted down by Kim’s loyal supporters. All opposition factions and individuals were either purged or fled the country not soon after. Regardless of the promises he was giving to the Soviets and his own people, Kim had few plans to change the way he led.^[5] He would continue to glorify his own image and further, concentrate on the concept of Juche in order to completely isolate his people from anything other than himself and the new North Korean vision.

By 1974, leadership in North Korea had been officially set up to be transferred to his son Kim Jong-II. There was little differentiation between his rule and his father’s, “Kim Jong Il’s image as a leader has been so strongly imprinted in the minds of twenty-three million people that no other hero in history, with the exception of his father, has been able to challenge his prestige in North Korea.”^[6] Kim Jong-Il still pursued the policy of Juche religiously, and while his South Korean counterparts enjoyed a progressive economic boom, North Korea began to fail economically. Economic progress saw a halt, and as this began to worsen through the 1980s, large projects were deemed the answer to this problem. Large projects that only added a sense of prestige to the nation, rather than a move for a calculated economic recovery, were pursued. This included a massive hotel and a large dam, which largely exacerbated the economy’s stagnation, and further contributed to the sharp economic decline in the 90s. With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, North Korea used this as an opportunity rather than a disappointment. This goes along perfectly with the North’s internal policies where bad news is almost never given; the propaganda team assures that every piece of news has some kind of spin on it. The North Korean leadership proclaimed this was a perfect opportunity to fully embrace Juche, rather than an occasion of disappointment. Immediately North Korean students studying in the USSR were pulled back home after the USSR disavowed communism. Further, it was declared that Gorbachev betrayed the USSR and was a terrible leader, in order to explain the collapse of a formerly powerful socialist nation. However, no matter how much North Korea wanted its citizens to focus on Juche and work harder to keep the economy stabilized, without simultaneous economic aid from Russia and China it quickly became clear that Juche was not enough to hold up the economy. Famine and extreme poverty defined the 1990s for many North Koreans, as leadership floundered in their ability to remedy the situation.^[7] What began as a strategic alliance that provided many mutual benefits and was centered around common enemies had now turned into a complete abandonment, not out of distaste but an inability to sustain power. North Korea was left to pursue its communist vision without its largest political ally, and likewise without its largest economic contributor. This would leave North Korea in quite a bit of distress initially as we have already seen, but slowly the economy recovered to somewhat normal levels, or at least levels where they could somewhat feed their own people.

Bibliography

International Crisis Group. “North Korea-Russia Relations : A Strained Friendship. Update Briefing. Brussels: International Crisis Group.” Update Briefing: Asia Briefing No. 71, 4 Dec. 2007, http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/north_korea/b71_north_korea_russia_relations___a_strained_friendship.

Kim, Sung Chull. North Korea under Kim Jong Il: From Consolidation to Systemic Dissonance. Ithaca, UNITED STATES: State University of New York Press, 2006. http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/muhlenberg/detail.action?docID=3407373.

Lanʹkov, A. N. (Andreĭ Nikolaevich). From Stalin to Kim Il Sung: The Formation of North Korea, 1945-1960. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 2002. https://www.loc.gov/catdir/enhancements/fy1616/2001048795-b.html.

Radchenko, Sergey. “‘We Do Not Want to Overthrow Him’: Beijing, Moscow, and Kim Il Sung, 1956.” Sources and Methods (blog), Wilson Center,  August 7 2017. https://www.wilsoncenter.org/blog-post/we-do-not-want-to-overthrow-him-beijing-moscow-and-kim-il-sung-1956.

Tertitskiy, Fyodor. “The Ascension of the Ordinary Man: How the Personality Cult of Kim Il-Sung Was Constructed (1945–1974).” Acta Koreana 18, no. 1 (2015): 209–31.